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EUROPEAN ATTITUDES IN EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
AFTER ECONOMIC CRISIS
Introduction
The “Brexit heritage” and the growing size and inﬂ uence of Europhobic parties, 
together with a legacy of economic and ﬁ nancial crisis, cast a “dark light” on the 
future of the European Union. 
So the European Union celebrated its 60th birthday, in March 2017, in a cli-
mate of profound uncertainty for its future.
Never as in those months have the questions about the prospects of a united 
Europe become complicated. Even the White Paper, handed down by European 
Commission President Jean-Claude Junker, has tackled the root of the problem.
The political events that took place in the following months – especially 
the elections in France – have removed the most pressing concerns, but there is 
no doubt that the situation is not yet completely outlined. Even the elections in 
Germany at the end of September 2017 – the other political-electoral appointment 
on which the attention of observers and political actors focused on – allowed the 
knots to loosen.
The Italian national elections in March 2018 seem to throw new dark shad-
ows on European integration path: thus the future deﬁ nitely seems to be something 
to be written, although some signs of optimism are beginning to emerge.
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However, to what extent has the economic crisis, after threatening the very 
existence of Europe, altered the structure of relations between citizens and the EU?
The goal of this paper is to inquire into the determinants of people’s support 
for European institutions, also considered as institutional conﬁ dence, focusing in 
particular on the attitudinal consequences of holding an aﬀ ective feeling towards 
Europe that can be labelled as “European identity”.
In more detail, the goal is to assess to what extent European identity con-
tributes to the explanation of European support (in this case, European Institutional 
Trust) compared to other determinants. Previous research on such support found 
that people’s evaluations followed mainly an instrumental logic – support being 
dependent on a perception of personal or national beneﬁ ts accruing from member-
ship in the European Union (EU) – with an additional role played by European 
identiﬁ cation and other factor, such as trust in Europeans. 
This contribution expands the previous analysis, done well after the begin-
ning of the economic crisis and aims to oﬀ er a comprehension of the structure of 
the European attitudes.
The paper is organized as follows: in the ﬁ rst section, I discuss the concepts 
of European identity and European institutional trust. Subsequently, I review the 
main theories that have been elaborated to explain the development of political sup-
port for the EU. Thus, after a description of data and measurements, in the second 
section I oﬀ er a description of distributions of European Institutional Trust across 
Europe. Finally, I test a model that assesses the explanatory power of European 
identity on EU support as compared to other variables. The concluding section 
reviews the ﬁ ndings and the implications for future research.
European identiﬁ cation and Trust for European Institutions 
European identity is often seen in literature as a component of more general at-
titudes towards European integration; in early research it is even interpreted as 
being synonymous of support (see Inglehart 1970); European identity is also seen 
as diﬀ use support of the political community as a part of the political system (e.g., 
Duchesne and Frognier 1995); later research has explicitly interpreted European 
identity as a link to a political community distinct from general support for the EU 
itself (e.g., Scheuer 1999). 
According to Social Identity Theory (SIT) (Tajfel and Turner 1986), identity 
is a feeling of attachment to a salient group: so European identity is an attachment 
to a salient supranational community.
Diﬀ erently from a nation, the EU faces diﬃ  culties in becoming a proper 
polity because people’s primary loyalty is still weak. Europeans do not share 
a single common history, culture and values. On the other hand, this traditional 
reasoning can be questioned, since Europeans do share a relevant past (the Greek 
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polis and the Roman Empire, the Crusades, the Renaissance, Romanticism and 
the French Revolution). However, together with a common heritage, Europeans 
share religious conﬂ icts such as the cleavages between Catholics and Protestants, 
Latin and Orthodox, the Christian and Islamic world. Moreover, there are ex-
treme political divisions within Europe: its history is a history of wars, culminat-
ing in the First and Second World Wars and the Cold War. In addition, Europeans 
do not share a common language. On balance, it might therefore be argued that, 
since basic elements of a common identity are lacking, the divisions are stronger 
than the commonalities. This perspective sheds a bleak light on the possibility of 
a European identity.
However, stressing the identity achieved component’s (Huddy, 2001) deﬁ n-
ing European identity could be easier also because together with the vertical dimen-
sion (the sense of belonging to), a collective identity could also imply a horizon-
tal dimension (the so-called sense of community, or sense of belonging together) 
(Kaina and Karolewski 2013; Green, 2007). Another point is stressed by Checkel 
and Katzenstein that contrasts a ‘cosmopolitan’ vision with a ‘national-populist’ 
declination of identity projects (2009: 11). There are few doubts that European 
identity is something closer to a cosmopolitan allegiance, because it stresses po-
litical rights and citizenship, while national-populist European identity focuses on 
cultural authenticity.
Political support could be instrumental and diﬀ use (see Easton 1965); this 
latter is crucial for a political system’s life. In Europe, with the end of the initial per-
missive consensus on EU integration, people’s support was conceived as a possible 
“remedy” to bridge the gap between supranational governance and citizens. Then, 
in this paper, the basic idea is that European identity might increase the legitimacy 
of EU governance, also via a “resilience” mechanism. 
Public perception of the EU covers several dimensions and literature sug-
gests a number of typologies to conceptualize them. Moving from Easton’s (1965, 
1975) notions of speciﬁ c and diﬀ use support, Norris (1999) distinguishes ﬁ ve ob-
jects of political support (political community, regime principles, regime processes, 
regime institutions, and political authorities). Conceptually, popular support for the 
basic principles of the EU is conceived as the level of popular approval for integra-
tion project as whole. 
But citizens’ orientations towards the EU also include evaluations of the 
institutions of the EU. These assessments of the institutional design of the EU are 
most commonly assessed by asking respondents about their level of trust or conﬁ -
dence in various institutions. Institutional trust is explicitly linked to regime stabil-
ity since it enhances the likelihood of support by citizens believing that the political 
system will produce ideal outcomes. 
In Easton’s words, institutional trust could be seen as support for regime 
institutions; European institutions make decisions so – in a way – they are directly 
considered responsible for policies and answers given. 
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During the crisis, European Institutions are directly “under observation”, 
because of lack of responses. For these reasons the focus in this paper is on the 
European Institutional Trust, as a dependent variable. 
Before exploring the trends and the distribution of European Institutional 
Trust among countries the possible source of Europeanism should be considered. 
Therefore, the next paragraph will revise the literature on the predictors of Euro-
pean attitudes. 
Theoretical perspectives and research hypotheses 
on the sources of European Institutional Trust
The sources of Europeanism are of various nature. In a ﬁ rst step, the study of public 
opinion on European integration drawing on the tools and methods of the com-
parative study of regime support at the national level (Loveless and Rohrschneider 
2011: 5). 
At ﬁ rst, scholars followed the model of the permissive consensus (Lindberg 
and Scheingold 1971). Pro-European sentiments began to weaken with the Single 
European Act of 1987 and the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, which 
broadened the sphere of action and the range of competences of the EU and brought 
about its transformation into an (un)stable system of governance. Rejections of the 
Constitutional Treaty in France and Holland in June 2005 – even though for dif-
ferent reasons – and the bumpy road taken by the Lisbon Treaty before it became 
eﬀ ective in December 2009, again recall the question of the link between citizens 
and Europe. New theories were proposed and the subsequent empirical research 
on the determinants of European support is quite copious. They point to four theo-
retical perspectives that have been developed over time: cognitive mobilization, 
instrumental rational perspectives, political mobilization and aﬀ ective/identitarian 
explanations (Bellucci et al. 2012; Toka et al. 2012).
Chronologically, the ﬁ rst theoretical perspective used to explain attitudes 
to Europe was the cognitive mobilization theory advanced by Inglehart (1970). 
This was followed by a series of studies in which motivations of a utilitarian 
nature had a predominant role (Gabel 1998). Subsequently, a number of authors 
studied Europeanism according to the idea that political explanations oﬀ ered the 
key to its understanding (Anderson 1998; Sanchez-Cuenca 2000). More recently, 
the identity paradigm has been established, where national (and local) identities 
are seen as the variables explaining most of the variation of the orientations of 
public opinion towards Europe (Carey 2002; McLaren 2002; Hooghe and Marks 
2005). 
Summing up, ignoring the chronological criterion, the possible predictors of 
pro-Europeanism could be placed into two broad categories: economic and non-
economic, as suggested by Hooghe and Marks (2005). 
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The economic-utilitarian theory (Gabel, 1998), interprets the pro-European 
sentiments of public opinion as the product of rational thinking and therefore of 
a calculation. Membership of Europe is in other words evaluated on the basis of 
criteria of expedience and utility of the choice involved. This literature presupposes 
that citizens are capable of rational evaluation, and therefore of calculating the eco-
nomic consequences of European integration both for themselves and for the social 
groups to which they belong, including the nation. Attitudes towards the EU are 
thus the product of this calculation. The results of Gabel’s investigations showed 
that citizens that beneﬁ tted directly from community assistance (such as farmers) 
had a higher level of support for Europe: this is a reﬂ ection of so-called ‘egocentric 
utilitarianism’. The utilitarian approach also takes into account aggregate economic 
factors, according to economic voting literature (Lewis-Beck 1988). From this per-
spective, support for European integration is inﬂ uenced by the performance of the 
national economic system. In particular, support for integration is strong when the 
state of the national economy (in terms of inﬂ ation, unemployment and growth) is 
good (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993): this is so-called ‘sociotropic utilitarianism’. 
In sum, the central assumption of the economic or instrumental theory is that indi-
viduals’ orientations towards the EU result from a calculation of costs and beneﬁ ts. 
In very recent years, economic crisis played a crucial role in Europeanism, 
as several studies show (see Serricchio et al. 2013). 
This perspective in particular is useful because the economic crisis has 
threatened the very existence of the European Union.
Kuhn and Stoeckel (2014) look at the eﬀ ects of the crisis on support for 
European economic governance. As far as the utilitarian approach is concerned, 
the authors hypothesize an opposite relationship with support for EU governance 
during the crisis.
Lastly, Di Mauro and Serricchio (2016) assess the role of national institu-
tions as proxy for Europeanism, stressing also the role of some contextual variables. 
Among non-economic factors, cognitive mobilization (based on growth in 
levels of education among citizens, exposure to a wider range of information sourc-
es and consequently greater awareness of Europe and of the way it works) was 
thought to favour pro-European sentiments. However, in recent years, especially 
following the expansion in the range of competences of the EU and its various en-
largements, the identity explanation has become more relevant. In this perspective, 
national identity becomes a key predictor of the orientations of public opinion with 
respect to the EU. In Carey’s view (2002), the danger of a loss of power on the part 
of the citizen’s own member state deriving from the growing interference of the 
supranational institutions produces a negative reaction in those citizens who do not 
see the EU as a legitimate entity, and who in any case do not see or clearly recog-
nize the outline of a European identity. So, for Carey, strong national identities, in 
some cases reinforced by sentiments of belonging to a sub-national territory, con-
stitute an obstacle to European integration. McLaren (2002) focuses on the percep-
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tion of a threat to one’s own identity. The perceived threat posed by integration with 
other populations and cultures could be economic, deriving from possible conﬂ icts 
over economic beneﬁ ts enjoyed by minority groups, or it could derive from purely 
cultural considerations. The conclusion reached by McLaren is in line with that 
of Carey: strong national identities obstruct the process of European integration. 
However, the relationship between national identity and attitudes towards Europe 
seems to be more complex. For Duchesne and Frognier (1995), Bruter (2005) and 
Citrin and Sides (2004), in contrast to the interpretations of Carey and McLaren, 
the relationship between a sense of national belonging and pro-European senti-
ments is, rather, positive, and a strong national identity is fully compatible with 
positive attitudes towards Europe. Similar conclusions are reached by the authors 
of studies carried out by social psychologists (Cinnirella 1997; Huici et al. 1997; 
Catellani and Milesi 1998). 
Hooge and Marks (2005) have suggested that the national context has a me-
diating role: national identity works in opposite directions, in favour of or against 
European integration, according to the context concerned, and especially as a con-
sequence of speciﬁ c political events with the power to trigger nationalistic senti-
ments in citizens (in the case in point, the holding of a referendum on Europe). 
Accordingly, people holding exclusive national identity – in contrast to people ex-
pressing dual allegiance to both nation and Europe – would be less supportive of 
European integration. 
Other authors (Bellucci et al. 2012; Serricchio 2010 for the Italian case) 
stress the impact of diﬀ erent component of national identity (civic vs. ethnic or, as 
social psychologist claim, achieved vs. ascribed as in Huddy, 2001).
The role of European identity in determining pro-European attitudes is quite 
clear. In the Intune project (e.g., Serricchio 2011; Sanders et al. 2012) European 
identity has a relevant role as a predictor in European attitudes and, in fact, ac-
cording to Toka et al. (2012), European identity can be grouped into an aﬀ ective/
identitarian factor. 
According to Serricchio and Bellucci (2016), European identiﬁ cation is one 
of the most powerful predictor of pro-European attitudes also because could be 
seen as source of “resilience”. 
Therefore, as the level of identity increases, the propensity to identify with 
European institutions grows and develop feelings of trust in them.
So, this is the main hypothesis to be tested.
The third perspective introduces political mobilization factors and judge-
mental heuristics. The main idea here is that mass perceptions of Europe are de-
ﬁ ned in national political arenas and that parties, political elites and the mass media 
may ‘cue’ voters in their views towards Europe and its institutions (Hooghe and 
Marks 2005). Political explanations (or political cues) encompass theoretical per-
spectives whose wide range is reﬂ ected in a corresponding heterogeneity of empiri-
cal ﬁ ndings. One perspective emphasizes the way in which individuals use certain 
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political cues – which come to them from their own ideological orientations and 
the messages put in circulation by the political élites – to form their ideas about 
Europe. Underlying this approach is the conviction that individuals are not able 
to obtain complete information; that their capacity for rational thinking is limited; 
that they have only partial awareness of the relevant issues and therefore must 
make use of institutional and other forms of delegation. These studies therefore 
give special emphasis to the role of political parties as the suppliers of cognitive 
shortcuts (Gabel 1998). A second perspective focuses on citizens’ conﬁ dence in 
national institutions and in the national political system more generally. Anderson 
(1998) shows that the attitudes of citizens towards the EU – which is now a polity 
for all practical purposes, a polity sui generis though it may be – are to a degree 
ﬁ ltered by the national political and institutional system. In other words, conﬁ dence 
in institutions has a positive impact on citizens’ attitudes to Europe because the 
national institutions are used as cognitive shortcuts. Those who have conﬁ dence 
in their own political system are likely to develop attitudes of closeness to, if not 
conﬁ dence in, the institutions of Europe. However, the impact can also be negative, 
as Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) shows: those mistrustful of the national political system 
may develop strongly pro-European attitudes. So on the one hand, Anderson (1998) 
establishes a mechanism of institutional proxy in the context of which the national 
institutions are shortcuts to feelings of conﬁ dence in Europe. On the other hand, 
Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) provides conﬁ rmation of the hypothesis of a substitution 
mechanism whereby a lack of conﬁ dence in the national political system leads to 
the prediction of strong pro-European sentiments. Bellucci et al. (2012) show that 
the relationship between conﬁ dence in the national institutions and pro-European 
attitudes is in fact mediated by a third variable, namely, the quality of governance. 
In countries where this is high, the relationship is negative.
Data and measurement 
In order to do analysis and test hypothesis, I use a very recent Eurobarometer sur-
vey, the 88.3, which was released in November 2017 by the European Commission. 
In the following analysis, the dependent variable is the European Institu-
tional Conﬁ dence, an index that combines some classic measures of European in-
stitutional Trust, including both elected and not elected institutions: so, the scale 
includes general European trust, trust towards Parliament, European commission, 
European central bank; the variables were combined into an additive index and 
rescaled into a 0 – 10 point range, where 0 is the lowest level of conﬁ dence and 10 
the highest.
Usually, European identity is measured with survey instruments pertinent to 
belonging, territorial-geographical attachment and future feelings (Citrin and Sides 
2004; Sinnott 2006; Moreno 2006). 
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In previous research (Serricchio and Bellucci, 2016), European identity is 
conceptualized and measured according to Social Identity Theory that imply be-
longing and salience, captured by two questions which have been elaborated from 
Lilli and Diehl’s (1999) as reformulation of the Collective Self-Esteem Scale origi-
nally proposed by Luhtanen and Crocker (1992); unfortunately, the Eurobarometer 
survey employed for this paper doesn’t have the same items nor any similar. Never-
theless, it contains several parameters that measure emotional and aﬀ ective feeling 
toward Europe thus allowing to well grasp the feeling of European identiﬁ cation.
The questions included are: Europe perceived image, the European and the 
European Union attachment, the European citizenship and the classic measure of 
European identity, the so called Moreno question; the variables were combined into 
an additive index and rescaled into a 0 – 10 point range, where 0 is the lowest level 
of identiﬁ cation and 10 the highest.
European attitudes across time
The 2017 survey reveals some interesting ﬁ ndings. The (small) trends of some 
selected indicators – some of them are shown in ﬁ gure 1 and ﬁ g 1a for eastern 
Europe – describe as, from 2013, trust toward European Parliament is stable, trust 
toward European commission slightly decreases while trust toward Eu as whole 
slightly grows. 
In Eastern European countries, all indicators decrease. 
These trends need to be conﬁ rmed in the following months. So, next surveys 
most probably will tell us something more on this subject. For the moment, the 
results are quite uncertain. 
Fig. 1. Institutional Trust across time in Europe (selected indicators)
 EU Trust EU Parliament        EU Trust EU Commission      EU Trust EU
70
65
60
55
50
45
40
35
2007                                            2013                                             2017
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Fig. 1a. Institutional Trust across time in Eastern Europe (selected indicators) 
 EU Trust EU Parliament        EU Trust EU Commission      EU Trust EU
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Source: author’s elaboration based on Eb 67.2 (2007), 80.1 (2013) and 88.3 (2017).
Focusing on the described dependent variable, it has a moderate average 
intensity (5.23 on a 0-10 scale, n=27.746) with a 3.9 of standard deviation, that 
reveals a good variability among nations; so, as suspected, this level is not com-
mon to all European; indeed, the level of European institutional trust index var-
ies considerably across European nations, depending on national context, with 
ﬁ fteen countries over the average.
Also considering groups of countries, selected according to diﬀ erent crite-
ria including time to access Europe, the results show a greater level of conﬁ dence 
in the countries of the East, even compared to the founding members of Europe 
in the 50s
Therefore, a question could be raised: which factors explain this great vari-
ations among diﬀ erent national contexts? 
A preliminary explanation recalls the diﬀ erent impact of economic and 
ﬁ nancial crisis, the diﬀ erent level of national attachment but also – and possibly 
most importantly – the potential diﬀ erent role of national institutional conﬁ dence. 
Before going into multivariate analysis, we try to examine the distribution of Eu-
ropean institutional trust through citizens.
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Fig. 2. The distribution of the European institutional trust among countries and 
group of countries (mean value on 0 – 10 scale): 2017 
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European attitudes across people
In this section I try to describe the distribution of the level of trust towards the Eu-
ropean institutions according to some socio-demographic characteristics, dividing 
the sample among the citizens of the countries of Eastern Europe from those of the 
West. 
In general, the level of Europeanism is higher among those who have a high-
er level of education, both in Eastern and Western Europe. A fact conﬁ rmed by the 
evidence that younger people are more enthusiastic towards united Europe than 
older people. Also in this case, there are no substantial diﬀ erences between citizens 
of the Eastern and Western European countries
An entirely congruent interpretation can be advanced for the other variables 
used: those who work are more pro-European than those who are unemployed, 
as well as those who believe that they belong to a high social class show levels 
of conﬁ dence towards the European institutions that are higher, it is perceived as 
belonging to a low social class. Finally, the residence: those who live in rural areas 
have lower levels of Europeanism.
A particularly interesting observation can be formulated by observing the 
levels of European conﬁ dence depending on the self-positioning on the left-right 
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axis. While in the countries of Western Europe the classic curvilinear trend is 
observed, for which the centrists are considerably more pro-European, while the 
extreme wings, on the right and on the left, are more Eurosceptic, among the 
citizens of the Eastern countries a more linear trend emerges. And, with a little 
surprise, it appears that those are self-collocated on the right tend to be more pro-
European than those on the left in the political spectrum. It is a result all in all 
interesting on which it will be necessary, in the future, to investigate with more 
attention.
Ultimately, no particular diﬀ erences emerge between east and west Europe, 
except for the left-right self-collocation. 
Results are summarized in table 1. 
Tab 1. Eu institutional Trust according selected socio demographic variables 
Eastern Western
Left-right Mean N Mean N
Left 5,2 974 4,6 1376
Center-left 5,3 1264 5,7 3558
Center 5,4 3819 5,3 6058
Center-right 5,9 1643 5,4 2541
Right 5,9 1056 4,4 712
Education
Still studying 6,3 709 6,0 1138
15 4,8 1084 4,2 3079
16-19 5,1 6204 4,7 6060
20+ 5,9 3204 5,9 6156
Age
15-24 6,1 1015 5,7 1328
25-39 5,6 2492 5,3 3165
40-54 5,3 2851 5,1 4032
55+ 5,1 5016 5,0 8156
Occupation
Other 5,5 6025 5,3 8075
Unemployed 5,2 5349 5,0 8606
Residence
Urban 5,5 7854 5,2 11360
Rural 5,1 3520 5,0 5321
Social class
Working 5,0 3390 4,1 4329
Low-mid 5,2 1731 4,6 2242
Mid 5,6 5065 5,6 8040
Mid-high 6,4 438 6,6 1444
Higher 6,9 74 6,3 80
Mean 5,4 10698 5,2 16135
Source: author’s elaboration based on Eurobarometer 88.3 (2017).
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A more complex explanation is thus needed. In order to do so, some mul-
tivariate regression models are set up. In these models the dependent variable is 
always the European institutional conﬁ dence, measured as explained; the predic-
tors are selected and included according the theories presented and discussed in 
section 3. 
The next sections will present and discuss empirical ﬁ ndings.
Determinants of European institutional conﬁ dence 
So, what drives public support toward European institutions? 
The literature review has shown that several factors aﬀ ect the level of pro-
EU attitudes and may lead to changes over the years and between countries. 
As explained at the end of the previous section, the diﬀ erent theories on the 
sources of Europeanism could be operationalized following a rather widespread 
trend in the literature.
So, economic-utilitarian theory is operationalized with some classic indi-
cators included in most Eurobarometer surveys: the perception of actual state of 
national and European economy and the economic expectation, both national and 
European (this means, the expectations on economy in European scenario).
The political cues theory is operationalized with the national institutional 
trust, an additive index, built combining several indicators of national institutional 
conﬁ dence and with the traditional Left-right scale (that tap the ideology)
The identitarian theory is measured with two indicators: one refers to Euro-
pean Identity, the other one to National Identity. 
Media use serve as indicator for cognitive mobilization theory.
I start using a “basic” regression model (OLS estimation)1 with only indi-
vidual level predictors (table 2). 
In general the model ﬁ t the data reasonably well, as r-square reveals (.37,.31 
and.43). The last is the coeﬃ  cient for western European countries, in which model 
explains a greater portion of variance. 
The evidences suggest as follows: the economic variables are associated 
with great strength of support, also after the crisis. So, it is conﬁ rmed that the econ-
omy does directly impact the EU support. 
However, there are some peculiarities. The perception of the performance 
of the national economy does not have a substantial impact on Eastern Europe, as 
do expectations on the improvement of the national economy; on the other hand, 
the impact of the perception of the positive performance of the European economy, 
similarly to expectations on the future of the European economy, is able to explain 
the European institutional conﬁ dence more in Eastern European countries.
1 The socio-demographic variables are included mainly as control variables, without any 
speciﬁ c hypotheses.
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Tab. 2. European identity as predictor of European institutional conﬁ dence
Eu-28 Eastern Western
National economy ,022** ,003 ,041***
European economy -,035*** -,037** -,016
Economic expectation ,021*** ,014 ,02**
European econ omicexpectation ,008 ,022* ,005
Media use -,006 ,011 ,007
Naional institutional trust ,346*** ,267*** ,399***
European Identity ,411*** ,439*** ,385***
National Identity -,024*** -,012 -,036***
Left-right (ideology) ,015** -,028** ,03***
Adj-R-sq .37 .31 .43
N 22059 8337 13722
Source: author’s elaboration based on Eurobarometer 88.3 (2017). Entries are Beta (standardized) 
coeﬃ  cients and level of statistical signiﬁ cance Socio demographic variables (sex, education, age, 
social class and occupation) are included in regression but not shown OLS regression. 
Observing the conﬁ dence in national institutions, this predictor is very 
strongly correlated with the index of EU institutional trust, with a positive direc-
tion. 
This is a very relevant ﬁ nding, as the role of domestic governance is not 
always univocal and sometimes uncertain, as explained. With these data and this 
analysis its role appears to be quite clear. 
National identity has a weak impact, negative and not signiﬁ cant in Eastern 
Europe, while in Eu-28 and Western countries the impact is negative and signiﬁ -
cant. 
European identity has a relevant impact on general explanation: its impact 
on European institutional conﬁ dence is very important, both in European and East-
ern Europe. 
So, the sense of European identiﬁ cation greatly increases the conﬁ dence in 
European public institutions. Thus, the main hypothesis, according to these empiri-
cal evidences, is conﬁ rmed.
This is not a “prosaic” ﬁ nding: rather, it conﬁ rms the idea that an aﬀ ec-
tive link with supranational entity could promote also the institutional conﬁ dence 
and, broadly speaking, the political support for European integration project. The 
two concepts, certainly connected in citizens’ mind, however have diﬀ erent role, 
as many previous researches show. The casual link between them (whom cueing 
who?) is not totally clear and some endogeneity problems also could be raised. But 
this is not the place for this discussion. 
Rather, I would stress the importance of European Identify as reserve of 
goodwill.
The discussion on European identity and its nature and components are com-
plicate questions: 
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Nevertheless is quite clear its role in promoting public support. It will be 
enough? 
The European elections of 2019 will provide some answers. 
Conclusion 
In the last period the European Union was highly contested: in March 2017, the 
united Europe celebrated its 60th birthday in a very heavy climate, nor the White 
Paper, handed down by European Commission President Jean-Claude Junker, seem 
to indicate useful solutions.
The Presidential and Parliamentary elections in France seem to have re-
moved the most pressing concerns, but the picture is not yet completely outlined 
and the future of a United Europe is still under observation, also because the sub-
sequent events (election in several European countries, with growing inﬂ uence of 
Eurosceptic parties, lastly in Italy) raised new questions toward European Union. 
What will be the future is a very hard question: some signs of optimism seem 
began to emerge but polls are not encouraging2 and next European election became 
crucial. 
In this general climate, this paper aimed to assess if the economic crisis al-
tered the structure of relations between citizens and the EU. 
Previous research on support for European integration found that citizens’ 
evaluation followed mainly an instrumental logic – support being contingent on 
a perception of personal/national beneﬁ t accruing for EU membership – with an 
additional role played by European identity. 
This contribution expanded the analysis already done, mainly when the ﬁ -
nancial and economic crisis began to aﬀ ect popular conﬁ dence towards political 
institutions and, mainly, the supranational polity. 
The ﬁ ndings are quite surprising. First of all, pro-European attitudes show 
an increasing level among Europeans, although level of trust in European institu-
tions (and other indicators too) considerably varies across countries. The situation 
in eastern countries is slightly diﬀ erent. 
The ﬁ rst relevant ﬁ nding concerns the trust in national political institutions 
that appears always positive.
But the most important result to be highlighted concerns the role of Europe-
an identity that is able to contribute signiﬁ cantly to the explanation of the support. 
Probably this aﬀ ective attachment constitutes a reserve of resilience, able to 
drive public perception toward Europe across times of crisis, allowing to keep sup-
port at an acceptable level during peak of disaﬀ ection too. 
It’s good news, in a decidedly gloomy atmosphere. But to have more, we 
have to wait for the next European elections.
2 See, for instance, https://pollofpolls.eu [access on 2.11.2018].
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Postawy wobec Unii Europejskiej w państwach Europy Wschodniej po 
kryzysie gospodarczym
Niniejszy artykuł koncentruje się na postawach wobec UE/postawach europejskich w krajach Euro-
py Wschodniej, poddając analizie czynniki warunkujące poparcie obywateli dla europejskich insty-
tucji, przy wyeksponowaniu wpływu tożsamości europejskiej. Przez długi czas, a w szczególności 
przed kryzysem, oceny ludzi podporządkowane były głównie logice instrumentalnej, identyﬁ kacja 
europejska odgrywała tu dodatkową rolę. Później inne uzupełniające się perspektywy teoretyczne – 
związane z tożsamością i polityczne – ułatwiły interpretację europejskiego wsparcia. Niemniej po 
wybuchu kryzysu w 2008 r. ponownie kluczowa rola przypisana została motywacjom ekonomicz-
nym. Prawdopodobnie, ta mieszanka przyczyn pomaga wyjaśnić europeizm i nawet obecnie wiele 
interakcji pozostaje niezbadanych. W oparciu o badania Eurobarometru z jesieni 2017 r. (88.3) 
artykuł ukazuje, że tożsamość europejska odgrywa kluczową rolę w wyjaśnianiu wsparcia europej-
skiego również po kryzysie, zarówno w krajach Europy Zachodniej, jak i Wschodniej.
Słowa kluczowe: tożsamość europejska, zaufanie, instytucje, Eurobarometr, Europa Wschodnia
European attitudes in eastern European countries after economic crisis
This paper focus on European attitudes in eastern European countries, analysing the determinants 
of citizens’s support for European institutions, stressing the impact European identity. For a long 
time, especially before crisis, people’s evaluations followed mainly an instrumental logic, with an 
additional role played by European identiﬁ cation. Subsequently, other complementary theoreti-
cal perspectives – identity and political cues – helped to explain European support. But, after the 
explosion of the crisis in 2008, economic motivations have regained their crucial role. Plausibly, 
a mix of causes helps to explain Europeanism and even today many interactions remain unexplored. 
Using a recent Eurobarometer survey (88.3, autumn 2017) the paper shows that European identity 
plays a crucial role in explaining European support also after the crisis both in western and eastern 
European countries.
Key words: European identity, trust, institutions, Eurobarometer, East Europe

